Who is making decisions in Iran?

The stalled second round of talks with the US in Islamabad reinforces the point. Even when diplomatic channels are open, the system appears unable or unwilling to commit.

Control over the Strait of Hormuz is Iran's most immediate source of leverage. But decisions over its closure sit with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by Ahmad Vahidi, rather than the diplomatic team.

That places real power in the hands of actors who operate behind closed doors. Unlike previous crises, there is no single, identifiable figure clearly owning the strategy. Instead, a pattern emerges: actions first, messaging later, and not always consistent.

In practice, it is the IRGC's actions, whether in enforcing the closure of Hormuz or in striking targets across the Gulf, that appear to be setting the pace of the crisis. Political and diplomatic responses often follow rather than lead.

This does not necessarily signal a breakdown of the administrative branches. But it does suggest that operational autonomy of the IRGC has widened, at least temporarily, in the absence of clear political arbitration.

Into this ambiguity steps Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf.

A former Revolutionary Guard commander now serving as speaker of parliament, Ghalibaf has emerged as one of the most visible figures in the current moment. He has inserted himself into negotiations, addressed the public, and at times framed the war in pragmatic rather than ideological terms.

Within parliament and across conservative networks, resistance to negotiations remains strong.

Hardline messaging has intensified, with state media and public campaigns increasingly framing negotiations as a sign of weakness in the face of the country's enemies.

Ghalibaf's position is therefore precarious - active but not clearly authorised. He insists his actions align with Mojtaba Khamenei's wishes, yet there is little visible evidence of direct co-ordination.

In a system that depends on signals from the top, that ambiguity is telling.

Taken together, these dynamics point to a system that is functioning, but not coherently directed.

The supreme leader's authority exists but is not visibly exercised. The presidency is aligned but not leading. Diplomacy is active, but not decisive. The military holds key levers, but without a clear public architect. Political figures are stepping forward, but without uncontested legitimacy.

This is not collapse. The Islamic Republic remains intact. But it does suggest something more subtle - a system struggling to convert the leverage it has - for instance the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz - into clear strategy at a moment of acute pressure. It can still act across multiple fronts, but it struggles to signal clear direction to its own centres of power.

And in Iran's political model, signalling is how coherence is maintained.

For now, the system is holding the line, maintaining control and avoiding any visible breakdown despite mounting pressure. But increasingly, it raises the question of whether coherence is being exercised or simply claimed.