‘War crime’: Afghan-Pakistan truce under strain after university strike

Afghanistan rejects accusations that it is sheltering or aiding the TTP and other anti-Pakistan groups.

Mehmood Jan Babar, a Peshawar-based political and security analyst, said the engagement in Urumqi was thin from the start.

Delegations were at the level of diplomats, with no political contact throughout. Pakistan, he said, maintained a firm position and demanded action in writing.

“Until Afghanistan puts something in writing, no verbal commitment will be trusted,” Babar told Al Jazeera. “That is what was said in Urumqi, and that is where things stand.”

Representatives of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan held weeklong informal talks in Urumqi, Xinjiang, from April 1 to 7, 2026. The delegations of the three sides included representatives from authorities in charge of foreign affairs, defence and security [Handout/Ministry of Foreign Affairs for People’s Republic of China]

Tameem Bahiss, a Kabul-based security analyst, said the outcome reflected how little ground either side had shifted.

“The negotiations in Urumqi did not achieve a clear settlement or agreement,” he told Al Jazeera. “Both sides may agree to talks under pressure from regional countries, but once the talks end, the same problems return.”

Babar noted some softening on the Afghan side.

Muttaqi had reportedly instructed senior ministers to use more restrained language on Pakistan, he said, given how much Kabul has at stake in its relationship with Islamabad.

“But Pakistan’s core position has not changed,” Babar said.

The limits of mediation

This is not the first time a diplomatic opening has quickly unravelled.

A ceasefire mediated by Qatar and Turkiye in October 2025 was followed by continued low-level clashes.

A temporary Eid ceasefire in March after fighting had resumed in February – brokered at the request of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkiye – was almost immediately disputed.

The Taliban alleged Pakistan carried out dozens of mortar strikes in Kunar while the truce was still in effect.

The most contentious episode came on March 16, when a Pakistani air strike destroyed the Omar Hospital in Kabul, a 2,000-bed addiction treatment facility.

Afghan officials put the death toll at more than 400. The United Nations recorded 143.

Pakistan insisted that its target was not the hospital, but nearby military installations and an ammunition depot. The incident remains the most disputed of the conflict.

Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and China have all attempted to broker a lasting arrangement.

Babar said Pakistan had briefed all of them on its position that cross-border attacks on Pakistani soil had decreased when Pakistan carried out its own operations.

“That is a valid argument, and it is holding weight right now,” he said.

But Bahiss said the repeated failures point to something structural.

“The main problem is that Pakistan and Afghanistan have very different views of the security situation,” he said. “If both sides cannot even agree on the nature of the problem, it becomes very difficult for mediators to agree on a solution.”

The Kabul-based analyst added that internal pressures make compromise difficult on both sides.

“Pakistan risks looking weak domestically if it accepts vague assurances and the Taliban risks looking as though it is yielding to outside pressure [if it accepts Islamabad’s assertions],” he said.

The TTP impasse

At the core of the conflict is a dispute that predates the current fighting.

Pakistani soldiers patrol along the de facto Pakistan-Afghan border in Chaman, Pakistan, October 12, 2025 [Akhtar Gulfam/EPA]

Kabul denies harbouring the TTP and has accused Islamabad of using attacks in Pakistan as a pretext for interference in Afghan affairs.

Pakistan maintains that the burden lies with Kabul to take verifiable action and has sought written assurances that it says have not been provided.

Bahiss said months of military pressure have yielded little.

“The Taliban have not accepted Pakistan’s main demand in the way Islamabad wants,” he said. “They may be unwilling because of ideological or historical links, or unable because acting against the TTP could create internal divisions. Whatever the reason, the outcome is the same: Pakistan’s demands remain unmet.”

Babar said the picture inside Afghanistan is more complex than a flat refusal.

Several factions within the Taliban hold differing views, he said, with some facing public pressure.

He added that the Afghan Taliban had arrested a significant number of TTP members and their families and transferred them from the eastern provinces deeper into Afghanistan, though it remained unclear whether this constituted a policy shift or a tactical adjustment.

Afghan officials, meanwhile, argue that Pakistan’s campaign has caused civilian casualties that harden public opinion without addressing the underlying drivers of violence.

Talks without trust?

China’s role as host of the Urumqi talks carries weight. Beijing is Pakistan’s largest trading partner and has significant infrastructure investments in both countries through the economic corridor. It has a direct interest in stabilising the border.

But Babar said no agreement is possible without a written guarantee and a guarantor to enforce it.

He pointed to the Doha accord in 2020, in which the Taliban gave a written commitment that Afghan soil would not be used against any country, a commitment Pakistan says was violated.

The Doha Agreement, signed in February 2020 between the United States and the Afghan Taliban, committed the Taliban to preventing Afghan soil from being used by any group to threaten US or allied security, in exchange for a full withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan.

“Pakistan does not want to enter into any agreement that brings it no tangible benefit,” he said. “Until a written commitment comes, nothing else moves.”

Afghanistan has its own demands: That Pakistan keep borders open, allow trade, resume visas and accommodate Afghan refugees already in the country.

Babar acknowledged those as legitimate. But he said Pakistan’s line remained firm – that cross-border attacks must end in writing first.

“And since that commitment is not coming,” he said, “I do not see any agreement possible in the near future.”

Bahiss said external mediation cannot substitute for trust.

“A credible verification mechanism would require both sides to agree on how incidents are investigated, who verifies violations, and what happens if either side breaks the agreement,” he said.

“Without that, any agreement will remain fragile and may collapse as soon as the next attack or accusation takes place.”