Taking power in Mali might be a stretch but insurgents can force hand of weakened regime

Jean-Hervé Jezequel, Sahel project director for International Crisis Group, described “a major escalation in the conflict, a new stage reached by armed groups in the strategy that has driven them in recent years to attack Mali’s main urban centres”.

There are deeper underlying reasons for the new surge of violence. The Sahel offers a perfect storm of factors that lead to violent extremism: grinding poverty, instability, sectarian tensions and a history of decades of conflict that has left huge numbers of weapons.

Last year just under 70% of deaths from terrorism occurred in only five countries, of which three were in the Sahel.

A further accelerant is the brutal counterinsurgency tactics systematically employed by armed forces and Russian mercenaries across the region, and, above all, the failure of governments to provide basic services and security.

In country after country, militants have exploited this by offering protection and some basic assistance, as well as coercing communities into accepting their authority and strict Islamic rules. Expansion is essential to their campaign. Controlling populations means young men can be recruited and mosques can be used to bolster influence and authority. Control of roads and rivers means traffic can be taxed and routes used for lucrative smuggling operations.

Ulf Laessing, who runs the Sahel programme of Germany’s Konrad Adenauer Foundation from Bamako, said the main focus for JNIM was to carve out an enclave within Mali which would allow it to build up its “own state in some kind of autonomy”, as al-Sharaa and HTS did in Syria before launching their lightning offensive to overthrow the al-Assad regime.

The tactical alliance with the Tuareg separatists is in line with a strategy pioneered by al-Qaida, to which JNIM may owe a tenuous loyalty, which encourages militants to build relationships and connections with communities. It is unlikely the alliance would survive victory, however, according to analysts.

Laessing said JNIM and other Islamic militant groups were “testing the bulwarks of regimes everywhere”.

“I don’t think Bamako will fall … The JNIM can’t control large cities but they can force governments to their knees and negotiate with them and force them to adopt more of their ideology,” he said.

“JNIM plays a long-term game. They can simply wait until the state authority erodes further.”