How De Zerbi brought life to sinking Spurs

Randal Kolo Muani and Mathys Tel also had important roles. Kolo Muani often positioned himself between Tyrone Mings and Ian Maatsen.

If Martinez played to left centre-back Mings, Kolo Muani pressed intensely while angling his run to block the pass into Maatsen.

But if Maatsen looked likely to receive freely, Pedro Porro stepped up from right-back.

Spurs reacted to these pressing triggers with an impressive level of coordination.

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Spurs looked to cut off the right side of the pitch with their press while also man marking Villa's central midfielders - giving them few options to play out from the back

Villa's centre-backs and full-backs were marked which meant Martinez and Mings were limited to looking for their attackers who dropped deep centrally.

Spurs ultimately funnelled Villa's play down the middle while also setting up to have numerous players in that area of the pitch.

Tottenham were also ready to follow Villa's dropping forwards when this happened, with Kevin Danso particularly aggressive in stepping out to Ross Barkley, winning the ball and starting attacks.

When Villa played those riskier passes, Spurs' attackers immediately turned and pressed backwards, converging around the player in possession and increasing the chances of a turnover.

Villa struggled to progress the ball and Spurs in turn converted the opposition's possession into chances of their own.

It is a small sample size, but De Zerbi's Spurs have won possession in the final third 5.3 times per game on average - the highest average for any team under a manager this season, and a clear sign of intent.

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Spurs' central pressing trap forced Villa to play dangerous passes to their attackers who appeared free. In this instance Danso anticipated the pass and won the ball back - starting a Tottenham attack

Dazzling rotations pull apart Villa's defensive shape

In possession, Emery's 4-4-2 was pulled apart by some of the impressive rotations De Zerbi has become known for.

Danso, Antonin Kinsky and Micky van de Ven formed a wide three around Villa's front two which gave them an overload and helped them play out.

The Czech goalkeeper's ability with both feet also opened up a number of angles to help Spurs progress the ball.

Tottenham's two full-backs and two central midfielders were key to pulling Villa's shape apart.

One of the midfield two often moved wide either to drag one of Villa's midfielders with them - or to receive the ball unmarked themselves.

Joao Palhinha or Bentancur were seen dropping in to form a back three alongside the two centre-backs. This gave Spurs an overload against Villa's front two again, this time higher up the pitch.

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Palhinha moves into a right-back position and Kinsky’s ability to use his left foot to find him helps Spurs progress the ball from this situation

De Zerbi also gave left-back Destiny Udogie licence to push up the pitch - and he was often allowed to do so by Villa's right-sided attacker Jadon Sancho.

When Udogie did make darting central runs, a Tottenham midfielder would drop into the space he had vacated - filling in at full-back.

After enticing Villa to step up following a series of short passes, Kinksy tended to look long for Udogie's run.

Richarlison, Tel, Kolo Muani, and Gallagher would be close by, arriving to pick up any knockdowns - and Spurs, with territory and space high up the pitch, created numerous dangerous chances.

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Udogie runs from full-back unmarked as Kinsky plays a long ball over the top. Bentancur drops to fill in at left-back with Sancho remaining at right midfield

On the other flank, right-back Porro's movement infield dragged Morgan Rogers - nominally Villa's left-sided midfielder - with him.

In possession, Gallagher as Spurs' number 10 tended to move to whichever side the ball was on.

Tielemans would often follow him wide and Bentancur, recognising this, shuttled across to help Spurs create four v three situations on the flank: Bentancur, Gallagher, their winger and full-back against Villa's full-back, central midfielder and winger.

These numerical advantages helped Spurs establish strong attacking possession in the final third, spending less time defending in their own half.

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Porro's movement helped unsettle Villa's shape and allow the visitors to establish a strong attacking pattern

Belief and tactics work hand in hand

De Zerbi took over a Tottenham side struggling for form, confidence and with a series of key players out injured.

But he has already drilled into his side a set of principles that echo what he has done at previous jobs - albeit adapting them to the quality of his players.

Spurs play short from their keeper but are more willing to go long to a target man in Richarlison than De Zerbi's Brighton were.

Given the impressive physicality of the Spurs squad, utilising a high press as a method of chance creation has been smart too.

Tudor looked to take a similar albeit less coordinated approach out of possession, but De Zerbi has built on that - not defending man-to-man across the pitch but instead asking his side to pick moments in which to win the ball back.

None of these tactics however are possible without a squad that believes in the message the coach is relaying.

In his news conferences so far, De Zerbi has been focused on one idea - that Spurs must believe in themselves, and shake off any negativity, if they are to be a Premier League side next season.

Their performance against Villa will have certainly helped.